Obama called Libya his ‘worst mistake’ — 15 years later, North Africa’s military powers have spent over $320 billion arming themselves
Fifteen years after NATO helped topple Gaddafi, North Africa’s military powers appear to have drawn a lasting lesson from Libya’s collapse, spending more than $320 billion on stronger militaries, advanced weapons and deeper alliances to ensure they are not caught as exposed in a future crisis.
Fifteen years after NATO helped topple Gaddafi, North Africa’s military powers appear to have drawn a lasting lesson from Libya’s collapse, spending more than $320 billion on stronger militaries, advanced weapons and deeper alliances to ensure they are not caught as exposed in a future crisis.
- Fifteen years after the NATO-led intervention in Libya, North African countries have spent over $320 billion modernizing their militaries in response to regional instability.
- Former US President Obama acknowledged that while the intervention in Libya was intended to prevent mass civilian casualties, the lack of post-conflict planning led to prolonged chaos.
- Libya remains politically divided with ongoing economic decline, high fiscal deficits, and reduced GDP per capita compared to its pre-2011 status as one of Africa's wealthiest nations.
- Regional security concerns and the legacy of Libya's instability have driven Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and others to invest heavily in advanced weapons, deepening military rivalries and alliances.
In 2016, then-US President Barack Obama was asked to identify the biggest mistake of his presidency. His answer centred on Libya, where a NATO-led intervention had helped end Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year rule five years earlier.
In an interview with Fox News, Obama described his “worst mistake” as “probably failing to plan for the day after what I think was the right thing to do in intervening in Libya.”
He nevertheless defended the intervention, arguing that it “averted large-scale civilian casualties (and) prevented what almost surely would have been a prolonged and bloody civil conflict”.
Obama also acknowledged failures in managing the aftermath, conceding that there was “room for criticism” over the international follow-up.
Despite defending the military operation, he ultimately acknowledged the result.
“And despite all that, Libya is a mess,” Obama said.
Fifteen years after Gaddafi’s fall, Libya remains divided, while North Africa has entered a far more militarised era.
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North Africa is no longer the same
Since 2011, the region’s major powers have spent heavily to modernise their armed forces, investing in advanced combat aircraft, attack helicopters, drones, air-defence systems, missiles and warships.
In particular, Algeria and Morocco have emerged as North Africa’s main importers of major conventional weapons, while Egypt has also undertaken a significant military modernisation programme.
Between them, the region’s leading powers now boast stealth fighters, Rafale and F-16 combat jets, Apache attack helicopters, advanced air-defence systems, drones, missiles and modern naval platforms.
Overall, between 2011 and 2025, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt spent more than $320 billion on their militaries, according to calculations based on SIPRI data.
The military build-up has unfolded amid worsening regional insecurity, with instability spreading from Libya to the Sahel, Sudan and the Middle East, while North Africa’s major powers have forged different security alliances to strengthen their positions.
That spending, however, cannot be attributed to Libya alone. The Algeria-Morocco rivalry over Western Sahara predates the 2011 war, while Egypt faces broader security pressures across the region.
Even so, the fall of one of Africa’s wealthiest and most heavily armed states became a powerful warning for governments across North Africa.
Africa’s oil giant remains divided
The contrast is particularly striking because Libya entered 2011 as one of Africa’s wealthiest countries per person.
Just before the uprising, the IMF estimated that the economy had grown by about 10% in 2010, while non-oil growth reached about 7%.
The country also recorded a current-account surplus of about 20% of GDP, while the combined net foreign assets of the Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Investment Authority stood at roughly $150 billion.
At the time, the IMF described Libya’s macroeconomic performance as strong and its outlook as favourable, although it warned about high youth unemployment and dependence on oil.
By GDP per capita, Libya ranked among Africa’s richest countries around 2010, with World Bank data putting the figure at roughly $12,000, well above Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa.
Fifteen years later, despite still holding Africa’s largest proven crude oil reserves at about 48 billion barrels, Libya’s GDP per capita had fallen to about $6,449 in 2025.
By 2026, Libya’s nominal GDP stood at about $52.5 billion, around 17th in Africa, far behind Egypt at $430 billion, Algeria at $317 billion and Morocco at $194 billion.
More significantly, the IMF warned in April 2026 that Libya’s fiscal path had become “unsustainable”.
It estimated that the fiscal deficit reached about 30% of GDP in 2025, while public debt rose to around 146% of GDP, alongside double-digit inflation and growing pressure on reserves.
Libya becomes a warning for the West
Ironically, Libya has also become a cautionary reference in Western foreign-policy debates, invoked as a warning against regime change without a clear plan for what follows.
More recently, US Vice President JD Vance warned against allowing Iran to become “another Libya”.
Earlier in 2026, US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker made the concern explicit with the remark, “We don’t want another Libya scenario,” as the Trump administration sought to distance itself from forced regime change in Iran.
Fifteen years after Gaddafi’s fall, Libya is no longer cited only as an example of military intervention.
It has also become shorthand for the risks that can follow the collapse of a state’s political and security order, while its aftermath has helped turn North Africa into the continent’s most heavily armed region.
