Of a Defence policy devoid of an implementation strategy

A couple of years ago, I wrote a critical rejoinder on the ‘Letters to the Editor’ column of the Standard Newspaper in response to a letter of the same category from an individual whom I had presumed to be an anti-military establishment because he had attempted to lampoon the previous National Security Adviser to the […]

Of a Defence policy devoid of an implementation strategy

A couple of years ago, I wrote a critical rejoinder on the ‘Letters to the Editor’ column of the Standard Newspaper in response to a letter of the same category from an individual whom I had presumed to be an anti-military establishment because he had attempted to lampoon the previous National Security Adviser to the President of the Republic. In my naive view, the gentleman had erred in his alluding to professional incompetence within the security high command. He advanced further that “drafting a national security policy will not lead to reforms in the sector”, and by implication, therefore he doubted and trivialized the utility of a national security policy and a standing national army.

In keeping with professional integrity and the ethics of fair debate, I hereby submit that I was blinded by a genuine predilection towards a fellow officer upon my belief that he had unfairly been at the receiving end of a dressing-down by the anti-military establishment gentleman.

Today, while the consequential embers of the Chief of Defence Staff’s resignation might have simmered down somewhat, they will continue to smoulder beneath the surface, raising concerns about accountability, institutional integrity and the effectiveness of oversight. The security sector reform formulated in the wake of the Jammeh regime and the resultant National Defence Policy therefrom was not merely to carry out a strategic audit and re-orientation of personnel and military discipline. The crux of its stated objectives was to transform the defence institutions so that they would be professional rather than politically loyal, accountable rather than opaque, subject to civilian democratic oversight and governed by clear laws, procedures, and standards.

It becomes crystal clear from the foregoing that the security sector reform was never intended to be an exercise in replacing personalities, or satisfying partisan or tribal entitlements. Its purpose was to build professional defence institutions capable of policing themselves through integrity, discipline, and accountability.

In the face of this controversy at the Defence High Command, political pundits aligned with this administration would be inclined to quickly point out that senior officials are no longer untouchable, that public scrutiny under the wings of the print and social media matters, that the military leadership can be held accountable for conduct that attracts public concern. Topping all of that is the willingness of the executive to act when controversies arise. That is fair enough from a positive angle, if any, of the security sector reform.

Let us again state that the central promise of the security sector reform was institutional transformation. Therefore, if controversies continue to emerge at the highest levels of the defence apparatus, critics would be inclined to argue, from a negative angle, that the reforms have been largely cosmetic, predicated on the fact that the National Defence Policy lacks an implementation strategy. Under this negative view, the resignation controversy raises sceptical questions like: Have systems of defence oversight ingrained in the defence policy actually improved in the absence of a strategy? Are appointments based primarily on merit and professionalism? Have accountability mechanisms become institutionalised or are they still dependent upon political expediency, and is the defence institution genuinely governed by rules or by personalities?

Where the answer to these questions remain grey and unsatisfactory, then the resignation could be interpreted not as proof of security sector reform success but as evidence that deeper structural problems remain unresolved. In conclusion, the vexing issue remains whether the country has practically moved from a personality-based to an institution-based system because undoubtedly, the country’s stability depends on institutional norms and procedures that function regardless of who is in command.

Captain Joseph P Jassey, (rtd)
West Atlantic Security Risk Assessment and Management Consultancy