Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune received Mali’s Prime Minister and head of government, Abdoulaye Maïga, on Monday, in the first political meeting of this level since the sharp diplomatic crisis between the two countries erupted. The meeting is an official signal that relations are moving from de-escalation to an actual attempt at rebuilding understanding — though it doesn’t necessarily mean the deeper disputes between the two sides have been resolved.

A meeting with a clear security and political dimension

Tebboune was accompanied at the reception by Minister of State in charge of the General Inspectorate of State and Local Government Services Ibrahim Merad, presidential diplomatic adviser Ammar Belani, Director-General of Documentation and External Security Brigadier General Mousaoui Rachdi Fathi, and Algeria’s ambassador to Mali, Kamel Rezzag Bara. This level of representation reflects the breadth of the issues on the table, ranging from political relations and border security to economic cooperation, while the presence of the external security chief lends the meeting a clear security dimension — without necessarily implying that any announced security arrangements were reached.

Maïga’s visit, leading a delegation officially described as “important,” followed a phone call between Algerian Prime Minister Sifi Ghrieb and his Malian counterpart on August 9, during which both sides affirmed their commitment to fraternal, good-neighborly relations and their desire to give bilateral cooperation “new momentum.” Following his meeting with Tebboune, Maïga said the shared history between the two countries should serve as a foundation for building a regional space governed by peace and free of all forms of domination and colonialism.

Reconciliation, or simply managing the dispute?

The visit doesn’t mean the contentious files have disappeared, but it confirms that Algiers and Bamako have decided to move from open confrontation to managing their dispute through direct political channels. Genuine de-escalation steps had already begun in July, when the two countries reinstated their ambassadors and reopened their airspace to flights, ending a crisis that had lasted more than 15 months since the Algerian army shot down a Malian drone near the border area of Tinzaouaten in early April 2025.

Algeria said at the time that the drone had violated its airspace, while Bamako denied the account and accused Algeria of committing a “hostile act.” The three Sahel Alliance states — Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso — responded by recalling their ambassadors from Algeria, before Algeria took similar measures in return. But the drone incident was only the peak of an older dispute that had been building since Malian authorities announced, in January 2024, the termination of the 2015 peace and reconciliation agreement brokered by Algeria.

For Bamako, that agreement had come to represent a political and security phase it wanted to move past. For Algeria, its cancellation was a blow to one of its most prominent diplomatic achievements in the Sahel, and a sign of its declining traditional role as mediator between Mali’s central authority and northern movements. The current visit, then, looks closer to a “reconciliation of necessity” than a full return to the old relationship — the two sides still don’t agree on how to approach the crisis in northern Mali, but they appear to have reached a shared conclusion that continued rupture only compounds the risks without resolving any of the underlying problems.

The inevitability of geography

Algeria and Mali share a Saharan border stretching more than 1,300 kilometers, crossed by socially and tribally interconnected communities, as well as smuggling networks, armed groups, trade caravans, and migrants. As a landlocked country, Mali cannot ignore Algeria’s importance as a northern outlet and a regional power with political, security, and economic weight. Conversely, Algeria cannot guarantee stability in its southern depth without at least a minimum level of coordination with the ruling authority in Bamako.

Speaking to Al Jazeera about the background to the visit, Algerian economist and parliamentarian Abdelkader Berrich summed up this interdependence in three inevitabilities: a shared history among the peoples of the region, a geography that makes Sahel security an integral part of Algerian security, and a future that demands cooperation to confront security threats, economic imbalances, and climate and demographic shifts. In Berrich’s view, the resumption of Algerian-Malian contacts, alongside expanding cooperation with Niger and Chad, should not be read as a passing response to circumstantial political shifts, but as an expression of these three interlocking inevitabilities — part of a broader review of Algeria’s Sahel policy overall, one that also includes opening up to Burkina Faso.

From mediation diplomacy to project diplomacy

Algeria recognizes that regaining its influence in the Sahel is no longer achievable through political mediation and military cooperation alone, especially as the regional landscape shifts and new international and regional powers enter the competition. It has therefore begun a gradual shift from “agreement diplomacy” to “project diplomacy,” built around electricity, energy, transport, training, free zones, and trans-Saharan trade.

In June, Algeria inaugurated a 40-megawatt power station in Gorou Banda, in the Nigerien capital Niamey, built by state company Sonelgaz International and provided to Niger as part of bilateral cooperation. In May, Algeria and Chad signed an agreement to build a power station of the same capacity in N’Djamena, with the project’s foundation stone laid in June; the cooperation includes transferring expertise and training Chadian personnel to operate the plant and maintain the grid. With Burkina Faso, talks are moving toward expanding cooperation in hydrocarbons, mining, electricity, and fuel storage and distribution.

These projects amount to more than passing technical assistance. In countries suffering from severe infrastructure gaps, electricity becomes a gateway to improving hospitals, schools, and communications, running small factories, and attracting investment. Every successful project, in turn, creates long-term interests linking the beneficiary state to Algerian companies and expertise.

Where does Mali fit in the new strategy?

Mali remains the most sensitive link in Algeria’s Sahel policy. It sits closest to the tension zones along Algeria’s southern border, and the stability of its north is directly tied to the security of Tamanrasset, Bordj Badji Mokhtar, and the border communities. Reopening the airspace and reinstating ambassadors could pave the way for resuming trade, flights, and security communications, and the visit may open the door to transport, electricity, and trade projects linking Mali to Algerian ports and the trans-Saharan route.

But transplanting the Algerian economic model to Mali will be more complex than in Niger or Chad. The relationship between Algiers and Bamako is weighed down by mutual distrust and disagreement over the Azawad movements and the future of the north, on top of accusations exchanged between the two sides during the crisis. Algeria must also balance its official dealings with the Malian government against its historical ties to communities and political forces in the country’s north, while Bamako seeks Algerian cooperation that doesn’t give its political or armed rivals new room to maneuver.

A calculated return, not a completed alliance

Abdoulaye Maïga’s visit carries clear political weight, but it isn’t enough on its own to say relations have returned to what they were before the crisis. What has been achieved so far is a resumption of political contact, the restoration of diplomatic channels, and the reopening of airspace — not a comprehensive agreement on the outstanding security and political issues.

The success of this new opening will depend on both sides’ ability to translate the language of reconciliation into measurable steps: border coordination, resumed trade exchanges, protection of the movement of people, joint economic projects, and preventing the dispute over northern Mali from dragging relations back to square one. Algeria wants to reclaim its position as an independent regional power capable of combining security with development, while Mali needs to diversify its partnerships, ease its isolation, and make use of its Algerian outlet.

Between these two calculations, geography imposes its own simple conclusion: Algeria and Mali may disagree politically, but neither can afford to ignore the other.

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