Zimbabwe legislators must stop lying: no scientific data proves a seven-year term is better than five

Those who fail to defend the indefensible usually resort to lying.

Zimbabwe legislators must stop lying: no scientific data proves a seven-year term is better than five

Zimbabwe legislators must stop lying: no scientific data proves a seven-year term is better than five

 

BY Tendai Ruben Mbofana

 

 

Proponents of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 3) Bill, or CAB3, have resorted to a desperate script during ongoing parliamentary debates. 

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They are relying on unsubstantiated economic claims, pseudo-scientific assertions, and highly selective scriptural gymnastics to justify their goals. 

Ultimately, they want to extend the presidential and parliamentary terms from five to seven years.

Stripped of its technical jargon, CAB3 represents a transparent attempt at executive consolidation designed to artificially prolong political tenure while diluting democratic accountability. 

If those driving this amendment genuinely believed it reflected the will of the nation, they would not be engaging in elaborate legislative maneuvers to bypass a national referendum.

The economic arguments advanced by lawmakers in favor of a seven-year cycle collapse under basic scrutiny. 

One legislator claimed that potential foreign investments frequently ask about election dates and routinely stall capital projects two years prior to any vote. 

Another asserted that major development simply cannot be achieved within a five-year timeframe. 

These claims are entirely anecdotal and lack empirical foundation. 

There is zero verifiable data to suggest that extending an electoral term by two years alters the behavioral calculus of global capital. 

Investors do not flee or pause investments simply because an election is on the horizon.

They hesitate when there is a lack of institutional predictability, weak property rights, and an unstable macroeconomic environment. 

Shifting the calendar from five years to seven years does nothing to solve these structural issues. 

In fact, an investor who allegedly freezes operations two years before a five-year election will predictably do the same two years before a seven-year election. 

All a seven-year cycle achieves is an extension of the period of unchallenged governance, offering no guarantee of economic continuity.

Furthermore, concrete data and political case studies tracking global governance patterns offer no evidence that a seven-year tenure yields superior developmental stability compared to a five-year cycle. 

Instead, established global metrics show that longer electoral horizons consistently compromise economic and political outcomes. 

According to a 2010 study by Jess Benhabib and Adam Przeworski published in the International Journal of Economic Theory, longer political horizons directly degrade the immediate threat of voter sanction, which acts as a government’s primary incentive to perform for its citizens. 

When public officials are insulated from regular electoral reviews, political accountability plummets. 

This structural insulation directly harms the broader population’s material welfare; as demonstrated in a seminal 1995 study by Timothy Besley and Anne Case in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, a lack of regular electoral accountability leads to highly volatile fiscal cycles and directly depresses long-term economic performance. 

Furthermore, a 2013 study by Michael Smart and Daniel M. Sturm in the Journal of Public Economics confirms that extending political horizons reduces the incentives for politicians to act in the public interest, leading to increased political rent-seeking and systemic policy distortion. 

The assertion that development requires seven uninterrupted years fundamentally misinterprets the mechanics of national growth. 

Case studies of successful global economies reveal that long-term infrastructural modernization depends entirely on the stability of robust, independent bureaucratic institutions, not on keeping a specific political cohort insulated from the ballot box.

Is it any wonder, then, why only nine countries in the whole world have a seven-year term?

Faced with a lack of empirical evidence, proponents of CAB3 have remarkably pivoted to theological justifications, citing the spiritual significance of the number seven—such as the biblical command to circle the city of Jericho seven times. 

This is a dangerous and highly manipulative abuse of scripture to validate the prolongation of political power. 

​If selective scriptural interpretations are to dictate constitutional architecture, then the argument falls apart by its own logic. 

The number three is equally central to biblical narrative, yet no one is seriously advocating for a volatile three-year presidential term. 

Using scripture as a tool for political expediency sets a perilous precedent. 

What is to stop a future, power-greedy leader from pointing to the biblical significance of the number forty—the years spent in the wilderness or the days of the flood—to demand a forty-year electoral cycle? 

Merging secular constitutional law with selective religious symbolism is a cynical strategy designed to deflect from the absence of rational, performance-based arguments.

The reality behind the push for CAB3 is far more transactional. 

The parliamentarians championing these amendments stand to directly and personally benefit from an immediate extension of their own terms in office. 

To claim that this initiative is driven by popular demand is to ignore how the process has been managed. 

The thousands of voices cited by the parliamentary committee during public consultations do not reflect the generality of Zimbabweans. 

Ample evidence suggests these hearings were tightly choreographed, with ruling party supporters bussed in, coached on what to say, or directed to sign pre-written forms they likely did not fully understand. 

Independent civic expressions have been systematically drowned out to create a false veneer of national consensus.

The government’s persistent efforts to avoid a national referendum reveal their own underlying anxiety about the bill’s true popularity. 

The Constitution of Zimbabwe leaves absolutely no room for ambiguity: whenever a constitutional amendment’s effect is to extend the length of time a person may hold or occupy any public office, a national referendum is mandatory. 

Attempting to bypass the electorate is a direct violation of this supreme constitutional command.

The legal gymnastics deployed to bypass a referendum demonstrate an awareness that the broader population does not support these changes. 

If the architects of CAB3 truly believe that a seven-year term and indirect elections are in the best interest of Zimbabwe, they should stop hiding behind parliamentary majorities and stage-managed consultations. 

They must allow the people of Zimbabwe to express their true sovereign will on this amendment through a free, fair, and uncoerced secret ballot.