The Regionalization of Ruin: Gebru Asrat on the Tsimdo Alliance, Foreign Interference, and the New Battlefronts Threatening Ethiopia

Political and security friction between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has escalated to a critical threshold, threatening the structural integrity of the 2022 Pretoria cessation of hostilities agreement. The political standoff deepened significantly in May 2026 when the TPLF leadership unilaterally reconstituted its pre-war 2020 regional council.

By reappointing TPLF Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael as the regional executive, the party effectively bypassed the interim administrative frameworks previously negotiated with Addis Ababa.

This internal political instability is further compounded by a highly volatile realignment of forces across the Horn of Africa. Reports indicate that hardline TPLF factions have increasingly engaged with external actors, most notably entering into a tactical understanding with their former adversary, the Eritrean government, under an initiative known regionally as the Tsimdo framework.

Reports also indicate that the TPLF has sought broader security coordination, exploring operational ties with regional Fano militia factions in the neighboring Amhara region as well as elements of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) along the western frontier.

The danger of this escalating standoff materialized on the night of June 5, 2026, when a major drone strike hit the town of Sheraro in northwestern Tigray, located just kilometers from the Eritrean border, targeting a convoy of Tigrayan military vehicles, resulting in notable casualties.

Coming directly on the heels of Ethiopia’s national elections, the Sheraro strike has intensified international concerns that the region is sliding towards war.

Gebru Asrat shares similar concerns.

Gebru is a prominent veteran politician and a former senior leader in Ethiopian politics, best known for his influential role during the armed struggle of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and his subsequent transition into the political opposition.

Following the Derg regime’s overthrow in 1991, Gebru assumed the presidency of the Tigray Regional State, serving as a key architect of the early federal system and regional reconstruction throughout the 1990s.

A major turning point occurred after the 1998–2000 Ethio-Eritrean border war, when a severe ideological split over national sovereignty and governance fractured the TPLF leadership. Expelled from the ruling party during the historic 2001 purge, Gebru transitioned into peaceful opposition politics.

In 2007, he co-founded and became the chairman of Arena Tigray for Democracy and Sovereignty (Arena).

In recent years, having stepped back from active party leadership, Gebru has emerged as a political analyst. Utilizing his extensive institutional memory, decades of governance experience, and first-hand historical insights, which he detailed in his book, Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia, he provides critical commentary on the rapidly evolving dynamics in Tigray and the broader Horn of Africa.

Gebru conversed with The Reporter’s Yonas Amare about the recent developments in Tigray. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: There are recent reports of a drone strike in the Tigray region. Who was the intended target, and what was the primary objective behind this attack? Additionally, what is the extent of the casualties and infrastructural damage? Should this incident be interpreted as a sign of a renewed conflict breaking out in the region?

Gebru Asrat: There was indeed a drone strike in Tigray. The TPLF issued an official statement condemning the strike, characterizing it as wrong—particularly because it targeted armed personnel who were reportedly engaged in routine, daily activities at the time.

However, the information I gathered from different sources suggest that the drone strike specifically targeted ‘Army 13.’ These armed personnel had received urgent, high-level orders to deploy toward the Sudanese border. They had reportedly begun moving in a convoy of ten vehicles equipped with various weaponry. I think the government may have acted on prior intelligence.

The damage is not minor; meaning, it is quite significant. About ten vehicles loaded with weapons and personnel were targeted, and the strike was executed against them. I have heard that there are many casualties currently in hospitals in Sheraro, Shire, and other places, and that some individuals have also lost their lives.

Regarding the implications, the war has already been ongoing for a while. Meaning, officially, neither the TPLF nor the federal government has formally declared war, but the war has practically been ongoing for quite some time. Declaring war would mean that the Pretoria Agreement has collapsed. It means the peace agreement that was in place has failed. The TPLF has already voiced this. When they say this, it implies war.

When they state that the former government they agreed with needs to be dissolved based on that agreement, it implies war. When they say, “We have no relations with the current administration or with the federal government, nor with the constitutional government,” they have gone as far as establishing their own de facto or illegal government. This is another dimension.

There is also a direct relationship with Eritrea and Sudan, and an indirect one with Egypt. All of this constitutes an escalation toward war. Beyond that, even earlier, while Taddese Werede was still in office, war was already initiated. War was initiated in Tselemt, meaning battles were launched. Even now, various attacks have been carried out in Kobo and Woldiya. Therefore, it is just that it hasn’t been officially declared, but the war is actively taking place.

The current implication of this show of force, however, demonstrates the government’s warfare strategy, as it carried out an attack against the army. This army was moving to engage in combat in Sudan. In Sudan, there is a force called “Army 70”. The TPLF denies having relations with this force, but it is clearly known by all of us and reported across media outlets that Army 70 has been fighting alongside Al-Burhan’s military faction in Sudan, and it is known that they have suffered casualties there.

Now, what is clearly emerging is that TPLF militants, whom I refer to as TDF, are operating under the Sudanese flag and emblem. They have now openly declared their involvement. Currently, they have reinforced that area, and they have agreed to serve as mercenaries or contract fighters in this Sudanese war.

Just like before—we know about Tripoli; there were people fighting on the side of Tripoli, mercenaries alongside the Italians. Now, they are aligned with Sudan and Egypt as contract fighters, engaging in combat, and lives are being lost.

The implication of this is very high. Unintentionally, the people of Tigray, by being aligned with one faction and fighting Sudan, are creating animosity on one side—especially since there is a council formed by Sudanese political parties and civil societies. This creates conflict with them as well, and for the future, it should be recognized that it creates friction for the people of Tigray.

But what does the war look like now? Beyond just internal conflict, the war has taken on a regional dimension. Clearly, Sudan and Eritrea have mobilized their forces and are fighting on one front. Egypt is also involved via aircraft, training, and drones. Therefore, because the war has taken on a regional dimension, I view this as a defensive measure.

Personally, I am deeply saddened by those who have lost their lives. My position is that war should not exist. However, because the TPLF is pushing toward war and using it as a primary means to maintain power and avoid accountability, youth are continuing to perish. This is one aspect. If it continues, it could lead to massive destruction and displacement. Therefore, the implications are very serious. That is how I view it.

If the war is transitioning into a full-scale conflict, similar to the previous war in Tigray, which area or region is likely to become the main front of the battle? Which area is in the most critical condition?

What is happening is that both sides have their own warfare strategies. Currently, the TPLF has aligned itself with other forces—with Shabia, with Fano, and with other forces they refer to as Ethiopian militants—with the intent to enter Addis Ababa. One route to Addis Ababa would be through the Kobo line and the Sekota line. This is what they are attempting, and if you look at the deployment of forces, a large force has been deployed along the Kobo line, the Raya line, the Sekota line, and the Mekelle line.

On the other hand, a new strategy seems to be the reinforcement of a large force on the Sudan side, with the intention of entering through Humera. From what I see, reinforcing that force around the Metemma and Sudan borders is part of it. The Al-Burhan government of Sudan has also made this area the main center of the war. Since the border spans from Metemma and Demazin up to Humera, another front is bound to open there. Therefore, the war could generally span the entire Ethiopian border from Metemma to Damazin.

So, if a conflict breaks out, it will not be confined to a single front; there will be at least three main fronts. Aside from the Kobo and Sudan fronts to Mekelle, there is also a massive military presence around the Shire front.

Therefore, it won’t be restricted to just one front. While there are three distinct and well-known fronts developing, one is this critical Sudanese front. Another is the Kobo front, which extends all the way from Kobo to Mekelle. Additionally, there is a highly significant force deployed in the northern and northwestern parts of Shire. Consequently, both sides maintain their own specific combat strategies to win this war.

Depending on what the Ethiopian government wants to achieve and where it intends to enter, forces have now been heavily consolidated across all lines, including the Kobo route, the Sekota line, and the Afar line. Therefore, if this war is officially declared, it is bound to become an offensive pushing directly toward Mekelle. A massive military presence is stationed in the Tsilemti and Humera areas as well. This deployment serves to counter any invading forces that could attempt to enter either through Sudan or Eritrea.

So, they have designed their strategies believing it will lead them to their desired destinations. However, the dynamic and layout of the war can shift at any moment. We cannot look at this as a static, single line of conflict. An attack from one side, followed by a counter-offensive from the other, can completely alter the active battlefronts.

But as it stands right now, this is the current military layout and deployment of forces.

Military analysts are currently releasing assessments indicating that the force known as Army 13 has crossed over into Sudan via Eritrea to join up with Army 70. Furthermore, there are indications that a brand-new, previously unknown front is being planned and developed along the Benishangul-Gumuz region, specifically around the Blue Nile (Abay) territory. If we look back to history, before the EPRDF fully defeated the Derg regime, similar military maneuvers were executed in that area. Could this plan be a deliberate replication of that historical strategy?

The overarching layout and deployment of forces are similar. The critical shift we are seeing now is that previously, the Sudanese provided support primarily through logistics, provisions, and various supplies during the armed struggle. Now, however, they have formed a direct military alliance—an alliance with the group referred to as “Tsimdo” or the joint front.

The Derg regime used to arm and support insurgent factions inside Sudan as proxies to counter threats. Similarly, Sudan used to back Shabia and the TPLF during their respective struggles. What we are seeing today is fundamentally different because it has evolved into a direct military alliance. From a strategic perspective, their primary focus centers heavily on the Blue Nile (Abay) basin near the border. This is highly strategic for Sudan because of their own hydro-electric power generation facilities.

It is also immediately adjacent to where the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is located.

Therefore, this specific region is an area they highly covet and prioritize. For Egypt and Sudan, controlling Ethiopia or disrupting this zone is viewed as a massive strategic victory. Egypt and Sudan are working hand-in-hand on this, and both the TPLF and Shabia have alignments here. Their mutual intent is to dismantle or neutralize Ethiopia’s leverage over the Nile, ensuring the dam cannot function optimally. This is definitely one of their primary strategic directions.

The other direction, as we observe along the Afar and Kobo lines, is designed to launch a coordinated push toward Addis Ababa. They openly claim that they can advance and capture the capital. This brings us back to the alliance between Shabia and the TPLF. While this alliance existed in the past, it has now been revitalized into a massive, highly coordinated force. Previously, Sudan was not directly entrenched on the battlefield with combat troops, nor did the TPLF have active combatants openly fighting on Sudanese soil. Sudan used to focus strictly on its own territorial defense.

However, now, they have consolidated into a singular military front comprising Shabia, the TPLF, and the Sudanese military apparatus. Other factions, like Fano and various regional militants, are also part of this broader alignment. Their shared consensus is that they must unite their capabilities to launch a decisive strike. This is the reality of the current military alignment.

Regarding this newly formed military alignment, could we say that it serves as an instrument to execute and fulfill the strategic agendas and interests of foreign nations or external actors?

Absolutely, without a shadow of a doubt. Of course, these internal groups have their own explicit goals and political objectives. The TPLF is trying everything it can to reclaim its dominant political power, at least within Tigray, and ultimately across the rest of Ethiopia. Their ultimate ambition is to restore their past authority.

Another primary motivation for them is to completely evade legal and historical accountability. They want to ensure they are never held responsible for the immense destruction and war crimes committed in the past, as well as the devastation caused by the ongoing conflicts. They are fighting to escape criminal prosecution.

Beyond these internal motives, what I consistently stress is that the TPLF is actively collaborating with external forces—specifically Sudan and Shabia—through direct military integration. The ultimate objective of these external forces is to dismantle Tigray and Ethiopia. If they cannot completely destroy the state, their goal is to severely weaken and fracture it.

Look closely at the administrative system currently being implemented inside Tigray; it is shifting directly toward a highly restrictive, Shabia-style regime. They are enforcing forced conscription on the youth, completely erasing civic, democratic, and political spaces, and systematically dismantling institutional frameworks, media freedoms, and civil society organizations. Anyone who dissents or opposes these policies is immediately subjected to mass arrests. They are replicating an authoritarian governance model inside Tigray, which perfectly aligns with the interests of these external actors.

However, the ultimate intent of these foreign powers is the complete destabilization of Ethiopia. This is precisely why we must firmly oppose this entire military alliance. Foreign interference has reached an unprecedented level. Historically, Tigray was known for its resilience in repelling external aggression and protecting sovereign integrity. Today, the TPLF leadership has completely abandoned that legacy; they are actively waging war against their own country and targeting the civilian population of Tigray.

Egypt has historically tried to control or disrupt the Abay [Nile] basin to secure its own water interests, and they are attempting the exact same thing today by trying to weaken and dismantle Ethiopia. They want to prevent the Ethiopian people—including the people of Tigray—from ever utilizing and benefiting from their own natural resources. The TPLF has essentially become the primary internal partner facilitating this hostile foreign agenda. Other insurgent groups participating in this alliance must look in the mirror and seriously evaluate their positions.

Ultimately, whether this conflict escalates today or tomorrow, an internal civil war will only result in mutual destruction. Ethiopia has survived many internal conflicts throughout its history, but conspiring with foreign adversaries and serving as an instrument for external forces to destroy one’s own nation is a profound betrayal and a grave historical crime. Because the ultimate objective of this alliance is the destruction of the country, it can never be justified or accepted. This dangerous reality is now completely visible and unfolding right before our eyes.

The hostile policy that Egypt pursues regarding Ethiopia is something we see in reality. Similarly, Shabia continues to advance a visibly hostile approach toward Ethiopia. TPLF is working with Shabia, Egypt, and the Sudanese; and it appears to me that Egypt is the primary coordinator of them all. However, I do not believe that the entire Eritrean or Sudanese populace supports this stance. I cannot say that all Sudanese people view Ethiopia as an enemy.

In fact, many Sudanese may oppose Egypt’s intervention and attempts to exert influence over their country.

Nevertheless, General Al-Burhan’s army seeks Egyptian assistance to maintain its grip on power and to win its ongoing war. This is precisely why I argue that if a conflict erupts, it will become a regional war. General Al-Burhan’s Sudanese army and Shabia have clearly aligned their military forces together in this coalition, while Egypt participates by supplying both weapons and financial backing. Therefore, if war breaks out in Ethiopia again, I do not think it can be viewed simply as an isolated conflict between the federal government and the TPLF or Fano.

So, this cannot be viewed simply as the TPLF acting alone, nor can it be framed as a single faction’s conflict. That interpretation is entirely incorrect and flawed. It has completely transformed beyond that reality.

Based on your comprehensive analysis, can we say the conflict is rapidly transitioning and evolving into a full-scale geopolitical front?

Exactly. It has taken on a fully internationalized dimension. The core issue to understand is that these internal forces lack independent capability. The TPLF lacks the autonomous capacity to sustain this. Because they have completely lost their internal strength, resources, and self-sufficiency, they cannot operate as an independent force without heavily leaning on and attaching themselves to external actors. They completely lack the active support of the public, they lack the backing of the youth, and they even lack the cohesive support of their own military apparatus.

This is why they have consolidated this military alliance with external entities across every metric. This allows them to secure continuous logistics, access military provisions and heavy weaponry, and obtain broader regional backing through any means available.

As I see it, their relationship with Shabia represents a deep strategic alliance. It is purely strategic. The factors we discussed earlier align because they share an identical governance system and follow a completely parallel operational path, making their alliance strategic. Their immediate objective is centered on dismantling and fracturing Ethiopia. They seek to completely crush and weaken the Tigray region, eroding its internal stability.

All of these external elements have converged. On Shabia’s side, there is a clear intent to completely neutralize and eliminate any internal opposition or dissenting political factions. Similarly, their mutual goal is the complete erasure of any alternative political space. They seek to engineer a landscape where no internal challenge to their absolute authority can exist.

To achieve this absolute control, they are fully prepared to orchestrate the fragmentation of the Ethiopian state and the devastation of Tigray. This is their definitive strategic trajectory when they formed Tsmedo. So, from the very beginning, this alliance has been a military partnership. Although they try to deceive the public by labeling it a people-to-people relationship, the alliance was built from the start on military and political objectives.

What is the current state of affairs in Tigray? We can see that the Pretoria Agreement has effectively collapsed, and the Interim Administration has also been dismantled. At the same time, reports indicate that a massive, forced conscription campaign targeting the youth is being aggressively executed across the region. What are the true conditions in Tigray right now?

The situation inside Tigray has reached an incredibly tragic, desperate, and devastating stage. The region is currently experiencing a total convergence of multiple crises.

First, there is a profound political crisis. The Interim Administration no longer functions effectively. Power has been completely seized by a highly radicalized TPLF faction that has assumed absolute control through coercion and force. Consequently, a severe political crisis grips the territory. There is no legitimate, legally recognized, or constitutionally mandated governance framework operating in the region.

The economic and social conditions have deteriorated into utter misery. The economy is completely paralyzed and shut down. There is absolutely no financial support, budgetary allocation, or resource flow coming from the federal government. Furthermore, critical trade routes are completely blocked, and the supply of essential commodities and fuel is heavily restricted. Virtually all vital development projects have ground to a total halt. Water infrastructure projects, road construction, and essential public works are completely frozen. Nothing is operational. As a result, the economic landscape is in a state of total collapse.

Compounding this is the aggressive war mobilization and propaganda campaign orchestrated by the TPLF, which began long ago. This has systematically drained the economy. Potential investors, rather than bringing capital into the region, are actively fleeing Tigray to escape the instability.

The youth, facing a total lack of employment, economic opportunity, or a viable future, are fleeing the region in massive numbers. Tens of thousands of young people are actively migrating toward the central and southern parts of Ethiopia. We see this reality clearly; you can observe it directly in Addis Ababa and across various other major regional hubs. Young people are fleeing the region in droves.

The TPLF is systematically stripping the region of its productive population, effectively turning Tigray into a hollowed-out territory, very similar to the societal model enforced by Shabia in Eritrea.

Furthermore, educational institutions have been prematurely shut down. Schools and training centers have been closed long before the conclusion of the academic cycle. Social services, healthcare systems, and community institutional networks are rapidly disintegrating.

Agricultural production is also entirely paralyzed. We are currently in the month of June (Sene), which represents the critical planting and sowing season. This is the time for essential agricultural cultivation. Yet, instead of allowing the youth to work the land, the authorities are hunting them down like wild animals, forcefully separating them from their farms and livelihoods. As a direct consequence, agricultural lands are left completely uncultivated. If the youth are prevented from farming and sowing crops during this vital window, it will inevitably trigger a catastrophic, widespread famine across the region. The very crisis they have manufactured is actively destroying agricultural productivity and collapsing the regional economy.

Socially, the entire fabric of life has been upended, forcing Tigray into an unprecedented state of emergency. This brings us to the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The regional leadership continuously exploits the plight of IDPs for political propaganda. Yet, the reality is that an even larger wave of displacement is actively unfolding. I am absolutely certain that the current volume of people fleeing Tigray far exceeds prior displacement figures. The most productive, educated, and skilled segments of the population are being forced out of the region.

They are systematically transforming Tigray into a wasteland. The enforcement of this aggressive war footing and forced conscription has left the youth with no alternative but to flee in whatever direction they can find. The humanitarian situation is deeply alarming.

And all of this immense suffering is being inflicted simply to protect the political survival of a single faction. To safeguard the power and positions of a select group—the TPLF junta—the entire population of Tigray is being subjected to endless conflict and destruction.

This does not mean the federal government is entirely free of responsibility for how these events have unfolded. If the provisions of the Pretoria Peace Agreement had been strictly, transparently, and decisively implemented by the government, the TPLF would never have found the pretext or the political space to engineer this crisis. They would have been entirely deprived of the excuses they use to justify their actions.

The safe return of displaced persons to their ancestral lands has stalled, dragging on for years. The restoration of normal administrative frameworks and the reintegration of territories back into a lawful system remain completely unresolved to this day.

Consequently, a multitude of unresolved grievances has accumulated. Critical post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation programs have not been effectively executed. Major infrastructure initiatives, road projects, and water supply networks were never properly revitalized. Numerous factories and manufacturing plants remain completely shut down.

The federal government failed to approach this region with a definitive, comprehensive, and stabilizing strategy that could secure lasting peace. This governance vacuum effectively handed the TPLF the perfect propaganda tool and enabled them to launch this aggressive war mobilization campaign. The lack of decisive action provided them with the leverage they needed.

Ultimately, both sides have contributed to a situation where no meaningful progress has been achieved, leaving the region entirely isolated and unstable. However, as I have consistently maintained, the primary and absolute responsibility for this immense destruction, suffering, and existential crisis rests squarely on the shoulders of the TPLF leadership.

Had the federal government addressed the demands raised by the TPLF, could this situation have been avoided?

Had the federal government taken a different stance, it would have stripped the TPLF of any pretext or excuse. Even so, as I mentioned earlier, the TPLF’s overarching strategy remains to crush Tigray and dismantle Ethiopia. Its true desire is to cling to power indefinitely without public election or legitimacy, cooperating with outside forces solely to protect its own interests. Its ultimate goal is to sustain tension and war as a means to escape criminal accountability.

If the federal government had addressed the grievances raised regarding Tigray, it would have, to some extent, denied the TPLF an excuse to instigate chaos.

Fundamentally, however, the TPLF has never possessed a culture of resolving issues through peace rather than war. Its signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement was touted as its first step toward peaceful resolution, yet even that accord was rejected by the core TPLF leadership holding real power. Consequently, the TPLF views peace merely as a tool to buy time, reinforce its position, and ensure its own survival, never as a matter of principle. It does not pursue peace on principle, nor does it consider it vital for the populace.

Nonetheless, had the federal government fulfilled its own responsibilities, it would have gained credibility among the public, causing the TPLF to lose its popular acceptance. In the aftermath of the war, neither the community nor the political majority in the Tigray region believes that satisfactory reconstruction has taken place. This failure has been clearly demonstrated in many ways.

If war breaks out and escalates into a full-scale conflict, what will it mean for Tigray, Ethiopia, and the wider region?

Any impending war driven by the TPLF and its foreign allies will result in regional devastation, draining Ethiopia’s national wealth and decimating its productive youth on both sides, despite widespread internal public opposition to the conflict. While the TPLF suffers from a severe lack of domestic public support and forced conscription, its leadership remains reliant on conflict for survival and is backed financially and militarily by external adversaries’ intent on destabilizing Ethiopia from afar—a betrayal of the region’s historic legacy of repelling foreign intervention.